

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2 December 1975

Memo For BOB ELLSWORTH

Bob:

Attached is a copy of the proposed Restricted Session for NATO which your office provided me. Also attached is a substantially revised and, in fact, different piece on the same subject. I'd appreciate it if you would do the following:

1. Make sure that the elements in your proposed statement are contained in the revised draft.
2. To the extent that we can enumerate any specifics under the priorities that have the higher priority as well as possibly one or two that are desirable but have a lower priority, I think that would strengthen the statement.
3. Is there anything that we could be saying about Spain, or Portugal, or Greece, or Turkey, or Iceland that would be constructive?
4. Is there anything by way of new initiatives or thrusts that we particularly want to be mentioning in this statement?



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5. Are there any problem areas that we want to try to disabuse them of their worries?

Finally, I'd like you to put your personal attention on this today or tomorrow so that I can have a reasonably good draft by Thursday. I assume that you will have talked with State to the extent that is desirable, or necessary.

Thanks,

DR



PROPOSED STATEMENT
(Restricted Session)

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at 1/10/51
Greece
by
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Long

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to touch briefly on four points.

The first is the continuity of US policy on NATO. NATO defense is fundamental to US foreign policy. It has been supported by all administrations, by all Secretaries of Defense and State, and particularly by the present administration. This support will continue. We will maintain and improve our forces in Europe, and will not reduce them unilaterally.

The second point deals with the NATO TRIAD of strategic nuclear forces, theater nuclear capability, and conventional forces. All three elements are essential, and we shall do our part in all three. However, it is the conventional arm that needs the greatest improvement, though some modernization of the NATO theater nuclear capability is essential. The need for improvement in conventional capability is underlined by the steady rate of improvement in Warsaw Pact forces; this need is not reduced by economic considerations or social demands.

My third point is related to the defense of the Southern Region. No one of the Southern Region nations can mount a successful defense alone, nor should any one of the Southern Region nations feel compelled to do so as long as it remains a full member of the Alliance. NATO defense in the Southern Region should reflect an effective utilization of the defense forces of Southern Region countries working together, with reinforcements available from other NATO countries. But the one essential factor in achieving this is political cohesion, and here the situation is far from satisfactory, both in the area of working together within the Region and



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in the area of facilitating the operation of reinforcement forces, whether in peacetime or in emergency.

The changing conditions in Spain may permit some improvement in Southern Region defense capabilities. It may be too early for a formal relationship, but I urge my colleagues of the Southern Region to seek ways and means of encouraging closer cooperation with Spain in the defense of the Mediterranean area.

My final point is that the United States intends to maintain a defense second to none. This is the stated aim of President Ford, as it is mine. We are working with Congressional leaders on adequate legislative support for our necessary defense effort. At the same time, we must prove to the American people that there is no waste in our defense program.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

